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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BETTY L. KESSIMAKIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,

Case No. 15387

vs.
DALE M. KESSIMAKIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This was a proceeding by a divorced husband, defendantappellant, to modify the provisions of a divorce decree
entered on August 28, 1974; and a proceeding by the divorced
wife to obtain judgment for unpaid alimony and support
money.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The court refused to modify the decree, found the
husband in contempt, and entered judgment against him for
$16,391.40 for past due alimony, support money, mortgage
payments, unpaid debts, and attorney's fees.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the district court entered on May 12, 1977, and remand to that
court with directions to modify the decree by fixing a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

reasonable time within which plaintiff may be permitted to
pay off the judgment for arrearages, and suspending the
payment of alimony and support money during the payout
period.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On April 22, 1974, respondent, Betty L. Kessimakis,
commenced this action against Dale M. Kessimakis, by filing
a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake County, and
having Dale sign an entry of appearance and waiver, prepare:
by Betty's attorney, in which he waived the time to answer
or otherwise plead and consented to the entry of his defaul·
and judgment in accordance with the demand of the complaint
(R 7).

On May 9, 1974, an amended complaint was filed (Rf

12), and Dale signed a like entry of appearance and waiver
with respect to the amended complaint (R 13).
The case was heard as a default matter on August 2,
1974, at which time Betty testified as to the grounds fur
divorce, the property of the parties and Dale's income.

s:

testified that the parties owned a home in which they had'
equity of $30,000, the home being worth approximately
$50,000, with a mortgage balance of $20,000; that Dale h~
an earning capacity of from $600 to $3,000 per month; ili~
for the past few months he had been earning $400 to $800
per week; that the home cost $4 7, 000 to $50,000; that Bet::
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had put up $15,000 of the purchase price; that Dale's father
had put up from $6,000 to $10,000, and that friends did much
of the work on the house.

She also testified that Dale had

a share, "not much," in a family corporation with his father
and brother (transcript of August 2, 1974).
On August 28, 1974, the court entered its decree of
divorce (R 19-21).

The decree granted a divorce to Betty,

awarded her the custody of the three minor children, subject
to reasonable visitation, $100 per month for each of the
minor children's support and maintenance, and $200 per month
as alimony.

The decree also required Dale to pay all debts

and obligations incurred by the parties during the course of
the marriage, and a $500 attorney's fee.
In dividing the property of the parties, the court
awarded Betty the entire equity in the residence (but ordered
Dale to pay the mortgage on it), all of the furniture, contents and appliances in the residence! one-half of Dale's
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., the parties' only automobile, and her personal effects, clothing, and items of
personal property then in her possession.

The defendant was

awarded his personal clothing and effects, one-half of his
interest in Kessimakis Produce, Inc., and the personalty in
his possession.
In February 1975, Dale filed a motion to set aside the
default divorce on various grounds (R 24-25) which was denied
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by Honorable Bryant H. Croft on March 21, 1975 (R 103).
Formal orders denying the motion were entered on March 26 ,
1975, and April 3, 1975 (R 104, 105).
Dale Kessimakis then appealed to this court from the
order denying the motion to set aside the default and the
judgment (R 108).

This court affirmed the trial court on

the ground that the motion to set aside the default judgme:
was not timely and an abuse of discretion had not been
shown.

In its opinion the court noted:

The principal complaint made by the defendant is that
the court imposed upon him a financial burden with
which he is unable to comply, and that the plaintiff
did not testify truthfully to his wealth and earnings.
If such be a fact, he is not helpless. He may petitic
the trial court for a modification of the terms of ~
decree, if there is a change in circumstances. While
his actual earnings now may be the same as they were
the time of the divorce proceeding, neither party can
at this late date dispute the findings made by the
court at the hearing.
If plaintiff's earnings and
wealth are now less than what the court found them to
be, there is a change of circumstances which would
justify a consideration by the court for need to modif.
the original decree.
(R 140).
When the case was remitted to the district court, the
husband filed a

motion to modify the divorce decree anda

petition for an order to show cause to modify the divorce
decree (R 144, 181-182), and on August 9, 1976, the court
entered an order to show cause based upon the husband's
motion and petition (R 188-189).

At about the same time,

wJ.· th an order to show cause of her
·
the wife was procee d J.ng
own:

why the defendant should not be held in contempt and
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amounts unpaid under the original decree reduced to judgment (R 194-197).
The matters were heard by Honorable Stewart M. Hanson,
Jr., on May 3, 1977, at which time both the husband and
wife testified (transcript of May 3, 1977).
Dale Kessimakis's evidence showed that he is 39 years
old (Tr 8), that he and Betty built a home in the spring of
1972 on land donated by Dale's father, which was worth
approximately $10,000 to $12,000.

In addition Dale's father

put up $9,000 in cash and Betty contributed $15,000 of her
own (Tr 9).

The couple borrowed additional funds from

Walker Bank to finance the home; Dale and his friends worked
on the house without charge; and a number of items were
provided by his friends at low cost (Tr 10) •
At the time, Dale was making $110 per week net, and to
increase

his earnings he worked for a friend setting tile

and raised quail for marketing (Tr 11).

In the 1972-1973

period, he earned approximately $1,000 to $2,000 per month
selling quail one of the years, and approximately $1,000 per
month the other year.

In raising the quail he paid only for

the feed, his father furnishing the lights and gas.
The home was valued in ~iay 1974 at $65,000, and was
furnished (Tr 12).

Walker Bank Company held two mortgages

on the home, one for $15,000 and one for $6,000.

The other

assets were his quail, a 1969 Oldsmobile worth $1,000 to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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$1,200, furniture worth approximately $3,000 to $5,000, an:

a piano.

He did not own any stock in Kessimakis Produce

(Tr 13).
Just prior to the divorce, Dale had approximately 200!
quail, one large brooder and a half dozen smaller ones, anc
one large incubator and one small one.

The quail were

"qirtonia" quail, which reached maturity in six to eight
weeks.

At the time of divorce Betty wanted $200 alimony,

$100 support money for each of the three children, and the

mortgage payment of approximately $318
more than $800 per month.

(Tr 14) a total of

In addition, Dale was ordered t

pay all obligations.
He testified that he gave Betty his entire amountof
his paychecks in 1974 (Tr 15)

and gave her money up until

January 1975 in cash (Tr 16).

Whenever he had extra monei

or received any from his father, he gave i t to Betty.
1974 his father gave him $1,000 to $2,000.

In

In these tram

actions he would simply ask his father if he could borro11
some money and his father would give i t to him.

He did

from Betty.
give receipts to his father or get them

In

(Tr 17)
January 1975, he had about 2000 quail left

one

brooder worth about $50, and one incubator

1

D(

worth about :

everything he could'
By that time he had sold just about
did not have any breeding stock left.

During 1974 heal'

sold all of his falconry equipment, most of his quail~
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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some cages, paintings, prints, his boa constrictors and
pythons, leaving him virtually nothing in the way of tangible assets.
In 1975 he had no gainful employment other than with
his father's company.

His father gave him money (Tr 18) in

the amount of about $2,000 per year over and above what he
earned at the company.

He kept records of payments to

Betty and the children in a small book (Exhibit 2-D, Tr 19),
and most of the money given to the children came from his
father.

The record he kept included produce and food brought

from the market, plus his salary (Tr 21).
Since 1975, Dale has not had any employment other than
working for his father (Tr 24).
week, net, or $823 per month.
when the divorce began.

He is now earning $190 per
He had earned $125 per week

The parties daughter, Cindy, had

been living with Dale for about six months prior to the
hearing (Tr 25) .
From the date of the decree, Dale paid Betty in cash,
giving her the amount of his paycheck, plus extra money
received from his father, plus the income from items sold.
He continued to do this until the end of January 1975, a six
month period (Tr 28).

During 1974 he received $1,000 to

$2,000, and perhaps more, in gifts from his father.

This

money he gave to the children and to Betty (Tr 31) •

In

1974,
the
from
his produce
job, of he
sold
some
Sponsoredbesides
by the S.J. Quinney
Law income
Library. Funding
for digitization
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Museum
and Library
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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quail and worked on a job with a friend.

At the time of th,

hearing he was working for his father in the produce busine,
He can't raise quail at this time because he does not have
breeders and does not have the funds to obtain any.

He has

one falcon left but does not raise any other birds (Tr 32),
Dale does not own any interest in the produce corporation and has not acted as an officer or director (Tr 34).
His father, who is 89 years old and runs the business, has
indicated that when he dies he may leave the business to
Dale and his brother (Tr 36).

Dale had not paid any part c

the $500 awarded as attorneys fees, and had not paid the
Master charge, but gave Betty money with which she could
have paid it.

He did pay the one doctor bill (Tr 37, 38).

For the years 1974 and 1975, his income tax returns
were prepared by a certified public accountant and were
filed with the Internal Revenue Service (Tr 39).

About a

year ago he had received from the company over and above h
salary, the amount of $1,500 to $1,700, but he did not
understand the difference between a "dividend" and a "bonu
(Tr 40).

This was the only extra money he had received fr

the business.

Other amounts he received from his fath~

came from his father's pocket.

He does not own a car ori

stock and does not presently have any substantial expense'
because he lives at his father's place (Tr 41-42) ·
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The income tax returns prepared and filed by the certified public accountant, William J. Jackson, Jr.

(R 176-177)

show that Dale's adjusted gross income for 1974 was $7,995.01,
and for 1975 was $9,365.55.
Betty Kessimakis testified that Dale had not given her
any money from the time of the decree until the end of
January 1975, that she lived on money she had in the bank
then sold furniture then went on welfare.
In 1976, Betty sold the home awarded to her by the
decree and received net proceeds of $38,000 (Tr 48).

She

used $19,000 of this for a down payment on a new home, paid
$1,300 on attorneys fees, used some for living expenses, is
buying furniture, and has no cash left (Tr 49).
She stated that as of November 1976, Dale began paying
her $350 per month, and this was received for the months
October 1976 through April 1977, but nothing else had been
paid since the date of the decree.

She testified that the

total amount owing to her by Dale is $15,391.40 (Tr 46).
ARGUMENT
I

The trial court's refusal to modify the divorce decree
was erroneous and ineauitable.
The Utah statute, and cases from almost everywhere,
consider divorce proceedings to be equitable in nature; but
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 9 - OCR, may contain errors.
Machine-generated

occasionally a case slips through the cracks of the equitable basket and a husband is pointed toward lifelong fiefdom.

Unless this court intercedes, this is such a case.
The governing Utah statute, 30-3-5 Utah Code Annotatec

1953 1 provides:
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property and
parties 1 and the maintenance of the parties and children, as may be equitable.
The court shall have contir.uing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or
new orders with respect to the support and maintenancE
of the parties 1 the custody of the children and their
support and maintenance, or the distribution of the
property as shall be reasonable and necessary* * *.
In this case there was nothing equitable about the
original decree.

With a stroke of the pen--by signing an

entry of appearance and waiver--the husband in effect gave
his wife virtually everything he had.

In a default proceec

ing she was awarded the home, the equity in which was wortf
nearly $40,000, and he was ordered to make the mortgage
payments of more then $300 a month on that home; she was
given one-half of what business interest he had; she was
given the parties' only automobile; she was given other
personal property; and she was awarded $200 per month alir:
and $300 per month for the support and maintenance of the
three children.

The husband was awarded his personal clof

ing and effects, such personal property as he might

haW~

his possession, and all of the parties' obligations.
But there was nothing he could do about that.

He hac

signed his life away and had awakened too late.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court Act provides for the appointment of counsel for children who are not represented, but makes no like provision for
unwary husbands.
Appellant recognizes that it is now too late to challenge the original decree; but in a proceeding for modification of that decree, the court cannot be unmindful of obvious
inequities in the original decree. Movever, it is at least
arguable that substantial changes in circumstance need not
be shown in order to obtain modification of a divorce decree.
Prior to its amendment in 1969, 30-3-5 U.C.A. 1953 read as
follows:
When a decree of divorce is made the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property, and
parties, and the maintenance of the parties and children as may be equitable; provided, that if any of the
children have obtained the age 10 years and are of
sound mind, such children shall have the privilege of
selecting the parent to which they will attach themselves. Such subsequent changes or new orders may be
made by the court with respect to the disposal of the
children or the distribution of property as shall be
reasonable and proper.
Since the 1969 amendment, the section has read, in part,
as follows:
When a decree of divorce is made, the court may make
such orders in relation to the children, property and
parties, and the maintanance of the parties and chi~d
ren as may be equitable. The court shall have cont~nu
ing jurisdiction to make such subsequent chan~es or
new orders with respect to the support and ma~ntenance
of the parties, the custody of th~ ch~ldr~n and their
support and maintenance, or the d~str~but~on of the
property as shall be reasonable and necessary * * *

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The earlier statute said nothing about jurisdicti~ ~
modify orders for the support of the children or the partie
but the court recognized that substantial changes in circ 111 •
stances might warrant such modification.

And in a recent

case, the court seemed to recognize a broader power under
the present statute than that found to exist under the prk
statute.

In Iverson v. Iverson, 526 P.2d 1126 (Utah 1974),

the court said:
We appreciate that all aspects of proceedings in divor
matters are equitable; and that the court has "con tim
ing jurisdiction to make such subsequent changes or m.
orders with respect to the . . . distribution of the~
perty as shall be reasonable and necessary"; and that
this includes the power to take the property from one
spouse and to award it to another where the interests
justice so require.
In making his determination the
trial court may consider not only all the present
circumstances of the parties, but what they may or ma
not have done in the rearing and support of the child:
The present statute, and the view of the court in
Iverson, suggest that when proper circumstances are

she~,

a court has continuing jurisdiction to modify a divorce
decree with respect to property, support, maintenance or
custody, if the present circumstances establish the necessity of such a change, without a showing of any substantio:
change in circumstances.

Certainly the legislature meant·

do something by providing for "continuing jurisdiction",
particularly in light of the interpretations of the for~e:
statute.
Be that as it may, the husband in this case is not
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR,
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required to rely upon that statutory construction, because
there was a substantial change in circumstances, or at least
a change in what the court must have regarded the circumstances to be at the time the divorce decree was entered.
In its earlier opinion in this case (R 140), the court
recognized that modification might be based not only on what
the facts were at the time of the original decree, but what
the court took them to be, saying:
The principal complaint made by the defendant is that
the court imposed upon him a financial burden with
which he was unable to comply, and that the plaintiff
did not testify truthfully to his wealth and earnings
at the time of hearing.
If such be a fact, he is not
helpless. He may petition the trial court for a modification of the terms of the decree, if there is a
change in circumstances. While his actual earnings now
may be the same as there were at the time of the divorce, neither party can at this late day dispute the
findings made by the court at the hearing. If plaintiff's earnings and wealth are now less than what the
court found them to be, there is a change of circumstances which would justify a consideration by the
court for the need to modify the original decree.
Although the court had made no findings with respect to
the value of the properties distributed to the parties, or
the earnings of the husband, it is apparent that those matters
were presented and presumably considered by the court at the
time the original decree was entered; and in those instances
in which a decree is based upon expressed or assumed facts,
a showing that those facts are not presently true may justify modification of the decree.
Felt v. Felt, 27 utah 2d 103, 493 P.2d 620 (1972), arose
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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in a different way, but recognized the importance of assUJ;,
or contemplated facts.

The court said:

* * *

we affirm our previous pronouncements that a
decree containing awards for support basedon
e1ther expressed or assumed facts contemplated by the
parties or the court or both, should not be modified
when the cornternplated facts are obvious or agreed tot
the parties and in turn incorporated in the decree ir
which the continuous jurisdiction of the court to ' ·
modify should not be used to thwart the expressed or
obvious intentions of the parties and/or the court,-unless such contemplated facts lead to manifest injus·
tice or unconscionable inequity.
d~vorce

In this case we are concerned with assumed facts and
expressed facts which turned out not to be true.

The fact'

assumed by the court are shown in the transcript of August
2, 197 4.

The primary ones were that the husband was able'.

make from $600 to $3,000 a month 1 that during the last fe·;
months he had been making "anywhere from four to BOO a
week," and that the equity in the horne was worth approxirnately $30,000.
At the hearing for modification of the decree 1 it was
shown that the defendent' s income at that time was $190 pe:
week or $823 per month, that his prior income had been su;·
lernented by sales of capital assets, that he no longer hac
assets to sell, that he was dependent upon income from his
job in the produce company and gifts and support provided
his father.

It also showed that the equity in the home

was substantially greater than the court was told.
Grounds for modification having been shown, the trk
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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court should have looked at the total situation of the
parties and should not have permitted continuation of a
situation in which the husband was saddled with obligations
which he will never be able to meet.
In the past this court has not hesitated to overturn
rulings of the trial court which have placed an impossible
burden on a husband.
In Hamilton v. Hamilton, 27 Utah 2d 206, 494 P.2d 287
(1972), this court substituted its judgment for that of the
trial court because a review of the record "led to a conclusion that that decree places a burden upon the defendant
that he will probably be unable to meet."
In Martinett v. Martinett, 8 Utah 2d 202, 331 P.2d 821
(1958), the court modified a judgment of the trial court which
awarded two homes to the wife, and said:
It seems to us that [the husband] is not entirely
without justification in regarding the property award
as so disproportionate to his desserts that it is a
poor reward for his long years of~ffort in contributing to its accumulation. He admits, however, that
the income that he had should be sufficient for his
needs if properly managed.
With due deference to the conscientious efforts of the
trial court to make a fair and equitable adjustment
between these parties, which he accomplished in the
main, we are nevertheless of the opinion that inasmuch
as the parties own two homes, the defendant should have
been awarded at least the one of the lesser value.* * *
In Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 296 P.2 977 (1956),
it was pointed out that

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~he court's ~esponsib~lity is to endeavor to provi~.

JUSt and equ~table adJustment of their economic re- ·
sources so that the parties can reconstruct their 1~
on a happy and useful basis.
·
Other courts have taken a similar view.

In Bell v.

~

150 Colo. 174, 371 P.2d 773 (1962), the court recognized
that where the property division made by the trial court is
inequitable or unconscionable, or where there is an abuse o:
discretion, the reviewing court will modify the action of
the trial court.

In Lopez v. Lopez, 148 Colo. 404, 366 P.l

373 (1961), the Colorado Supreme Court noted that the
divorce decree "should not result in an appropriation ofe
entire estate of the husband, or in the impoverishment oft
husband to the extent that he is unable to maintain himsel'
as a working unit."
Other cases recognizing that a divorce court shouMoc
make an award that will impoverish the husband, or would
leave him without money of his own, or lead to insolvency
are Santilli v. Santilli, 169 Colo. 49, 453 P. 2d 606 (196~'
and Rhodes v. Rhodes, 370 P.2d 902 (Alaska, 1962).
The difficulties encountered by husbands who are Y~
dled with a decree too weighty for them to bear is well
summarized in a concurring opinion by Justice Crockett in
Wallis v. wallis, 9 Utah 2d 237, 342 P.2d 103, 106 (1959):

* * * In many cases the circumstances [surrounding e
granting of the divorce) require that the husband be
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loaded with as heavy a burden as he can bear. Sometimes,
through no fault of his own, circumstances become worse·
th~ expense of going into court prevents him from seeki~g
adJustment of the decree; and when he is cited for contempt, an insuperable debt has accumulated. Different
from other obligations, it cannot be discharged in
bankruptcy.
So he finds himself floundering in deep
waters with such a weight around his neck that he will
never be able to extricate himself. * * *

* * * the purpose of the divorce decree and of the conduct of the parties under it must be calculated toward
the solution of existing problems and the sustenance of
the parties so they can reconstruct their lives on the
most wholesome foundation possible under the circumstances. The purpose of the provisions for alimony and
support money is to provide for the current needs, and
not to allow the beneficiary to sit by and permit a
burdensome debt to accumulate and then use it to harass
the defendant so that he cannot hold a job or live a
respectable existence. * * *
In this case the trial court should have done something
to relieve Dale Kessimakis of an unconscionable burden.
Regardless of what the facts

were at the time of the ori-

ginal divorce decree, at the time of the modification hearing
they were substantially different from what the court had
assumed them to be, based upon Betty's testimony.
Dale's present position is that he has a judgment
against him for $16,391.40, and is obligated to pay to the
plaintiff for her support and the support of the two minor
children still in her custody, the sum of $400 per month.
Interest on the judgment amounts to approximately $106 per
month, which brings the payments to in excess of $500 per
month,

just to stay even.

If Dale were to pay additional

sums to reduce the principal of the judgment, he would have
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no funds left for himself, and would be dependent upon the
charity of his father.
The divorce court, sitting as a court of equity, has
the power and flexibility to fashion a remedy.

It may be

true that it is too late to do anything about the property
division, but it is not too late to do something about the
alimony and support money in such a manner as to permit
Dale to pay the past indebtedness.

A reasonable and equit-

able remedy in this case would be to modify the decree to
amortize the judgment so that is would be paid off in 3 1/l
years, and suspend payment of alimony and support during

U

period, whereupon the court again could consider the needs
and financial abilities of the parties.

Such a decree wauL

permit Dale to extricate himself from the burdensome debts
that have been placed upon him and, at the same time, would
give to plaintiff funds necessary for support and maintenar.
of herself and the two children.
II
The court erred in adjudging appellant guilty of

N~E

The trial court not only refused to do anything to
relieve this husband of the unconscionable burden that had
been placed upon him, but found him in contempt of court a:
sentenced him to 30 days in jail.
The evidence established that the husband had made the
mortgage payments in the amount of $350 between February 1'
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and August 1976, and that subsequently from August 1976
until the date of trial, he had paid the sum of $350 per
month to the wife.
The court found that there had been no material change
in Dale's income or earnings since the entry of the decree,
"except to the extent that they have been self imposed."
There was no finding of ability to pay or of willfulness in
disabling himself from paying.

Yet the court concluded that

the defendant's acts, conduct and omissions had been contemptuous.

The findings do not support the conclusion.
While some cases have talked about inability to preform

being no excuse if he is unable to perform "as a result of
his own action;" e.g., Brown v. Cook, 123 Utah 505, 260 P.2d
544

(1953), the cases generally seem to require something

more then the mere fact that the party put it out of his
ability to perform.

There must be some element of willful-

ness or deliberateness in order to support a judgment for
contempt.

Ex parte Gerber, 83 Utah 441, 29 P.2d 932, 933

(1934); and Parish v. McConkie, 84 Utah 396, 35 P.2d 1001
(1934).
Ir. this case the defendant's inability might well have
been caused by something he did himself, e.g., selling of
breeding stock of quails and other capital assets in order
to satisfy indebtedness, but such inability would still not
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result from the willfulness or deliberateness necessary to
support a judgment of contempt.

The court here did not fir

such willfulness, but only that he may have put it out of
his ability to earn as much as he had earned previously.
CONCLUSION
The trial court seemed to forget that i t was sitting a
a court of equity and was bent upon punishing Dale Kessirnai.
for his inability to respond completely to the unconscionat
burden that had been placed upon him in the original decr~
notwithstanding preponderating credible evidence that there
had been a substantial change in circumstances from what tt
court assumed the circumstances to be at the time of entry
of the original decree.

This being the case, the court

should have exercised its equitable powers to grant some
relief to this appellant.

He cannot meet the payment schei.

imposed upon him by the court unless he obtains help from
friends and relatives.

This being an equity case, this

court may review questions of both law and fact.
Section 9, Utah Constitution.

Article'·

The findings of the trial

court are against the weight of the evidence insofar as
they find that there has been no substantial change of
circumstances. The equity in the home was substantially mo:
then Betty Kessimakis said it was, and Dale Kessimakis'
earnings were substantially less.

These facts, taken to-

gether with the amount of his present earnings, compared
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with the burdens of the decree, required the trial court to
grant relief.

Since it did not do so, this court should.
Respectfully Submitted,

Robert Ryberg
RYBERG & HcCOY
325 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
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